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Abstract
Party switching among legislative candidates has important implications for accountability and
representation in democratizing countries. We argue that party switching is influenced by cam-
paign costs tied to the clientelistic politics that persist in many such countries. Candidates who
are expected to personally pay for their campaigns, including handouts for voters, will seek to af-
filiate with parties that can lower those costs through personal inducements and organizational
support. Campaign costs also drive candidate selection among party leaders, as they seek to
recruit candidates who can finance their own campaigns. We corroborate these expectations
with an original survey and embedded choice experiment conducted among parliamentary can-
didates in Zambia. The conjoint analysis shows that candidates prefer larger parties that offer
particularistic benefits. The survey further reveals that parties select for business owners as can-
didates—the very candidates most likely to defect from one party to another.
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1 Introduction
Party switching among legislative candidates is a political dynamic with important implications for
democratization. Political parties are expected to undertake functions that make possible the norma-
tively desirable outcomes associated with democracy, including the representation of citizen prefer-
ences, the articulation of policy alternatives, and the mobilization of peaceful opposition. However,
these essential functionsmay go unfulfilled if regular inter-party switching by candidates undermines
the coordinating role of parties within the legislature or in the broader political system. Frequent
party switching is a worldwide phenomenon (Mershon and Shvetsova, 2013; O’Brien and Shomer,
2013) that appears to particularly affect party system institutionalization in late democratizing coun-
tries, whether in Eastern Europe (Klein, 2018), Latin America (Barrow, 2007), Southeast Asia (Hicken,
2009), or Sub-Saharan Africa (Booysen, 2006).
Research on party switching has advanced our understanding of how the office-seeking ambi-
tions of individual candidates condition their party affiliation choices. By focusing on the strategic
incentives of candidates, scholars have demonstrated that candidates defect between parties if such a
move will increase the probability of securing office (Heller and Mershon, 2005). Candidates are es-
pecially likely to seek entry into ruling ormajority parties (Heller andMershon, 2008; Thames, 2007).
Yet, while the extant literature has advanced our understanding of party switching by studying why
legislative candidates move between parties, we continue to lack answers to basic questions about
switching dynamics. What are the organizational attributes that matter most to potential switchers
when choosing among parties? What are the individual attributes that increase the likelihood that
candidates will be recruited by another party?
We pursue these questions with a focus on countries that underwent constitutional transitions as
part of the ThirdWave of democratization. Emerging patterns of party formation across late democ-
ratizers indicate that many new parties have turned out to be weak, short-lived organizations that fail
to consistently compete across successive elections (Bielasiak, 2005; Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014).
Few of the parties that emerged in ThirdWave democratizers have been able to mount programmatic
campaigns or cultivate the social linkages required to attract broad voter support. Given the evident
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weaknesses of such parties, more research is needed to understand how party leaders and potential
candidates negotiate affilition choices (Smyth, 2006; Szakonyi, 2020).
In late democratizing countries with clientelistic politics, we argue that the logic of party switch-
ing is driven, in part, by candidacy costs. Candidates in such systems must often pay for their own
campaigns because governments do not provide reliable public finance nor can voters afford to serve
as individual donors. As a result, candidates will seek to maximize the return on their personal cam-
paign investments by affiliating with parties that offer the organizational support or personal in-
ducements that can effectively lower campaign costs. Additionally, party leaders have an incentive to
enhance the competitiveness of their parties by recruiting candidates who can fund as much of their
own campaigns as possible. To compensate for their ownparties’ institutionalweaknesses, party lead-
ers will tend to encourage defections among candidates who already possess the financial resources
to independently pay the costs associated with mobilizing voters, including vote buying.
To corroborate the microfoundations of this argument, we analyze the party affiliation choices
of parliamentary candidates in Zambia. The country has regularly held multiparty elections and un-
dergone two peaceful alternations in power since political liberalization in 1991. The rate of party
switching hasmoved in tandemwith the electoral fortunes of parties over time, as candidates have de-
fected to ascendant or newly empowered ruling parties. As a result, neither of Zambia’s former ruling
parties, the UnitedNational Independence Party (UNIP) or theMovement forMultiparty Democracy
(MMD), continues to exist as a viable electoral vehicle out of power. The party system has fragmented
as new parties have emerged and old ones dissolved with each successive election (Rakner, 2011).
We examine original survey data on Zambian parliamentary candidates’ party affiliation choices.
We conducted a conjoint analysis that presented candidates with profiles of hypothetical parties to
experimentally assess how they weigh different party attributes. The findings show that candidates
want a party that offers personal inducements that lower campaign costs, namely, guaranteed adop-
tion as a party candidate and financial support during a campaign. The survey further shows that
candidates with greater financial resources are the most likely to be recruited by parties as well as the
most likely to defect between them. Being a business owner increases the probability that a candi-
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date will be recruited by a party by about 56% and increases the probability of defection by 45%. We
further show that business owners are five times more likely to claim that money must be given to
party officials (i.e., bribes) to guarantee themselves a nomination, suggesting that they are more likely
to deploy their financial resources accordingly.
The findings presented here contribute to the broader comparative study of party systems in de-
mocratizing countries. This study extends the frontiers of existing scholarship by illuminating the
role of campaign financing as a material incentive in the party affiliation choices of individual can-
didates. This insight helps refine and extend prior work demonstrating how the choices of political
elites can induce greater electoral volatility and thereby potentially impede party system institution-
alization (Smyth, 2006; Tavits, 2008).
We proceed by first discussing how the logic of party switching is underpinned by campaign costs
in the clientelistic political systems that persist among late democratizers. We move on to discuss the
Zambian context, the research design, and the results from the candidate survey. We conclude with
a discussion of our study’s implications for party systems research.
2 The cost calculus of party switching
Political parties in many late democratizing countries have failed to become institutionalized despite
participating in repeated elections since the transition to multiparty competition. This lack of insti-
tutionalization is particularly acute where prior authoritarian regimes were unwilling or incapable of
establishing durable structures to connect citizens to government (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011; Riedl,
2014). Few parties in such contexts have subsequently been able to develop the social linkages or
programmatic platforms required to cultivate a stable voter base, resulting in persistently high levels
of electoral volatility (Kuenzi et al., 2017). Under these conditions, parties have often defaulted to
clientelistic campaigning to win votes (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013).
We argue that the costs associated with clientelistic campaigning generate incentives for party
switching. Politiciansmotivated by a combination of vote- and office-seeking goals need to financially
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invest in clientelistic voter outreach to maximize their chances of electoral victory. The political
interests of party leaders and candidates are aligned in this respect, since spending more money will
increase the likelihood of controlling government and accessing the benefits of office. However, the
high costs associated with clientelistic campaigning pose a material constraint for party leaders and
candidates alike. Both need to contribute to the costs of a campaign in order to increase the likelihood
of electoral success, while simultaneously trying to minimize their respective expenditures. As a
result, party leaders and candidates find themselves in financial conflict, as each seeks to have the
other underwrite as much of those costs as possible. Party switching ensues because candidates seek
out parties that can lower their campaign costs, while party leaders aim to recruit candidates who
can pay for their own campaigns.
In countries dominated by clientelistic campaigning, party switching can be induced as the affil-
iation choices of candidates are influenced by the “electoral black market” —a term Szakonyi (2020)
originally applied to describe thewayRussian parties informally auction nominations amongprospec-
tive candidates. In such amarket, the price of a party’s nomination is effectively determined by supply
and demand. As more prospective candidates bid for a given party’s nomination, the higher the price
such a party can command. Szakonyi (2020) specifies that a nomination’s price does not solely re-
fer to the payments that candidates make directly to party leaders. Price connotes a broader set of
requirements that candidates must fulfill to demonstrate that they have the wherewithal to win a
campaign.
Securing a party’s nomination poses considerable costs for would-be candidates in the "electoral
black market." Parties in late democratizing countries typically do not hold open primaries in which
members or voters select from among possible nominees. Instead, in most parties, a committee of
party members or party leaders themselves will evaluate those seeking to become a nominee be-
hind closed doors. Such opaque selection processes can ramp up the costs for those seeking a party’s
nomination, as each potential candidate attempts to outbid the others either through payments to
whomever is involved in candidate selection (e.g., bribing committee members) or by visibly demon-
strating their capacity to mobilize resources for a campaign. In Ghana, for example, Ichino and
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Nathan (2016) estimate that candidates spend close to $75,000 to secure a party nomination through
gifts that range from school fees to motorbikes—all before the actual campaign even begins.
Money affects the party affiliation choices of candidates in the “electoral black market” because
clientelistic campaigning is a resource-intensive electoral strategy. Candidates must have the means
to pay basic costs for staffing, advertising, canvassing, and staging events. But, more importantly,
candidates need to have the funds required to personally engage in the distribution of resources,
including vote buying. In Kenya, parliamentary candidates report that giving voters handouts of
cash and goods represents their single largest campaign expense. According to a candidate survey
conducted during the 2007 elections, the average candidate spent 44% of their campaign budget on
handouts given to voters (Coalition for Accountable Political Financing, 2008). Candidates pay for
these handouts because they are effective in winning votes. Kramon (2017) estimates that 23% of
Kenyan voters have had their vote influenced by a handout.
Campaign costs enter party affiliation choices because candidates pay for most expenses out of
pocket. The fundraising channels employed in established democracies are typically unavailable in
countries where clientelistic politics prevail. Not only are voters unaccustomed to giving money to
candidates running for office, but the private sector is also insufficiently developed to serve as a con-
sistent source of campaign donations (Arriola, 2013). Candidates who affiliate with ruling parties
may benefit from public financing regulations that allocate funds based on prior seat or vote shares.1
Ruling parties are also able to redirect state resources to their candidates so they can outspend com-
petitors (Falguera et al., 2014).2
The outsized role of money in clientelistic campaigning ultimately forces candidates to assess
the financial and electoral tradeoffs entailed in their party affiliation choices. To understand how
these tradeoffs can affect party switching among candidates, we draw on the insights of Smyth (2006)
regarding the impact of party resources—reputational and material—on affiliation outcomes. Be-
cause parties largely control ballot access, the extent to which a given party possesses both types of
1Public finance regulation data are available at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database.
2The International IDEA handbook, Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, documents how ruling parties
around the world abuse state resources to finance campaigns.
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resources can be expected to drive candidate demand for its nominations and thereby the party’s
leverage vis-à-vis individual candidates.
As Smyth (2006) has shown in theRussian case, the parties that have a strong reputation (e.g., name
recognition among voters) as well as considerable resources (e.g., organizational capacity) are likely to
attract the largest pool of competitive candidates, namely, thosewho can pay for their own campaigns.
Candidates will seek to affiliate with such parties—even if it means defecting from their current
party—because their resource advantages not only increase the likelihood of electoral victory; they
also help to defray campaign costs. But precisely because these well-resourced parties attract more
candidates than they can place on the ballot, they can afford to reject many candidates who canmount
competitive campaigns, including incumbents. These rejected candidates will continue searching
among parties that vary in resource endowments until they find one that will offer a nomination on
terms that they can afford along the lines of the informal auction described by Szakonyi (2020). The
market for nominations should eventually clear, as candidates with more limited campaign financing
end up affiliating with parties that have neither reputation nor capacity but can still offer a spot on
the ballot.
The fluidity of the nominationsmarket described here will depend, in part, on the extent to which
ideology is a factor in national politics. The market could be ideologically segmented such that “con-
servative" candidates’ options would be limited to seeking nomination by “conservative" parties. This
wouldmake for a less fluidmarket overall, but, otherwise, themain dynamics described in this frame-
work would hold. Even within the constraints imposed by searching among the ideologically like-
minded, party leaders and candidates would aim to minimize their respective campaign costs while
maximizing their electoral prospects.
Our depiction of the nominations market generally suggests that candidates have an incentive to
switch to another party that possesses more resources as long as the choice does not diminish their
likelihood of winning. Other choices are less clear-cut. A candidate might be tempted to join another
party that promises greater campaign resources, lessening their personal financial burden, but that
party may also have a weaker reputation that hurts a candidate’s electoral prospects. Or, a candidate
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might be willing to spend more of their own money on a campaign if they can defect to a party that
increases their chances of winning. We highlight two party attributes—size and inducements—that
likely influence the tradeoffs candidates perceive in their affiliation choices in the nominations mar-
ket.
Party size: Candidates are likely to switch to larger parties that can lower costs through their
sheer size. This expectation is drawn from the literature’s ambition hypothesis in that candidates
have an incentive to join parties that can boost their electoral prospects. In this context, candidates
should seek to join larger parties because affiliating with popular parties may be a better way to guar-
antee electoral success and mobilize voters through the party’s grassroots structures (Smyth, 2006),
all without requiring additional clientelistic expenditure from the candidate. Popular parties can also
increase the likelihood of a return on candidates’ initial investment through policy influence and post-
election posts (Szakonyi, 2020). Switching should becomemore pronounced as the electoral fortunes
of parties rise and decline. In the Philippines, Aspinall and Hicken (2020) find that party switching
intensifies as elections approach because candidates seek to affiliate with the national party tickets of
the leading presidential candidates.
Party inducements: Candidates are likely to switch to parties that offer personal inducements,
both material and non-material. Due to the scale of the financial investment candidates must make
in their campaigns, they will seek out recruitment offers from parties that promise to lower or offset
their costs. One non-material inducement would be to offer a candidate a guaranteed nomination
rather than requiring their participation in an open primary. The candidate thus saves on the costs
associated with cultivating support among the party members who select the party’s nominees (i.e.,
bribing). An additional non-material inducement that could defray costs ex post is if a party promises
appointments to offices with rent-seeking opportunities. Alternatively, at the campaign stage, a party
can pay specified campaign costs outright (e.g., posters, flyers, t-shirts). InThailand, Thaksin Shinawa-
tra was able to build up his party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT), by using the promise of financial and political
inducements to lure local candidates away from other parties (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2005).
Party leaders understand that, if their parties are to remain electorally competitive, they must
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recruit candidates who have the financial wherewithal to meet the costs of clientelistic campaigns.
Parties depend on candidates being able to give out handouts while campaigning because such inter-
actions visibly demonstrate that they intend to continue delivering patronage to voters once in office.
This logic suggests that party leaders themselves will specifically encourage party switching among
candidates with the financial resources required for clientelistic campaigning. For their part, party
leaders are likely to focus on two candidate attributes: resources and linkages.
Candidate resources: Party switching can be stimulated by the type of candidate recruited by
parties, namely, businesspeople. Businesspeople have a personal stake in politics because govern-
ment determines the rate at which they accumulate wealth through policies governing regulation and
taxation. Where accountability institutions areweak, businesspeople can leverage their personal con-
nections to secure rents that increase their wealth, whether legally or illegally (Markus and Charnysh,
2017; Pitcher, 2012). Further, they can increase their control over those rents by entering politics as
candidates. Gelbach et al. (2010) demonstrate in the case of Russia that businesspeople aremore likely
to run for officewhen permissive institutional conditions enable them to pursue their special interests
through government. Szakonyi (2020) further shows in the Russian case that businesspeople have an
incentive to become candidates when parties are too weak to consistently represent their economic
interests or follow through on their policy promises.
Businesspeople have distinct advantages in meeting the distributive demands of clientelistic cam-
paigns. In Ukraine, Herron and Sjoberg (2016) find that higher levels of vote buying are not only re-
ported in constituencies with business candidates, but those levels also increase when multiple busi-
ness candidates compete in the same constituencies. In Benin, Koter (2017) shows that businesspeople
have progressively crowded out candidates from other backgrounds because they are more likely to
have the resources needed tomeet vote buying expectations. InMongolia, Bonilla and Shagdar (2018)
describe how businesspeople can acquire a reputational advantage among voters by distributing gifts.
Candidate linkages: Party leaders are also likely to recruit candidateswho have the social linkages
to mobilize large numbers of voters. Without stable partisan identities or ideological reputations,
parties have to rely on intermediaries who have the local connections as well as local knowledge
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needed to target clientelistic benefits. A candidate who is a member of a civic, social, or professional
organization can act as such an intermediary, particularly when such organizations have mobilizing
structures linked to communities outside a party’s electoral base.
Parties depend on candidates’ personal linkageswith other intermediaries tomagnify the credibil-
ity of distributive promises during campaigns. In African countries, intermediaries such as traditional
chiefs, urban slum leaders, and religious leaders routinely endorse party candidates with the expec-
tation that, once elected, they will channel benefits back to their constituents (Koter, 2016; Paller,
2014). Voters, in turn, know that they can rely on their intermediaries to lobby the candidates and
parties to ensure that they fulfill their distributive promises.
The framework presented here suggests that party switching emerges dynamically as candidates
and parties attempt to match electoral ambitions to financial resources. As long as clientelistic cam-
paigning means that greater spending can increase vote share, party leaders have an incentive to
recruit the candidates who can spend the most in their respective constituencies. This logic may
even induce parties to replace incumbent parliamentarians with new candidates because they are
known to have more personal resources at their disposal. By the same token, as the wealthiest can-
didates seek to join stronger or larger parties that can lower their costs, they can also leverage their
personal resources to negotiate the terms of affiliation, possibly extracting promises of pre-election
subsidies (e.g., guaranteed nomination, defrayed campaign costs, access to grassroots networks) or
post-election appointments such as ministerial portfolios. Party switching ensues as both party lead-
ers and candidates seek, with each successive election, to maximize their electoral prospects while
minimizing their costs.
3 Party switching in Zambia
We focus on Zambia to examine how campaign costs influence party switching among candidates.
Zambia has a first-past-the-post electoral system with single-member districts, which interacts with
regionally concentrated ethnic diversity to shape national party dynamics. Zambian parties tend to
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Notes: The solid line shows the effective number of parties per election, while the vertical bars re-
flect the number of inter-party defections. The defections coded in 1996 and 2001 occurred among
candidates who contested underMMD; the defections coded in subsequent elections occurred under
MMD, PF, and UPND.
campaign on the basis of valence appeals rather than staking out distinct ideological positions (Bleck
and van de Walle, 2013). Analyses of party manifestos reveal no clearly identified issue ownership
among parties (Rakner and Svasand, 2004). Over time, the party system has been characterized by
the entry and exit of several parties in each electoral cycle (Opalo, 2019). Between the 1991 and 2016
elections, an average of 8 new parties appeared each election to compete for parliamentary seats; an
average of 10 other parties that ran in the previous election failed to re-appear on the ballot.
Figure 1 illustrates how the number of effective parties in parliament (the solid line) has evolved
over time in tandem with party switching (the vertical bars). Initially, there was little party switching
after UNIPwas replaced as the ruling party byMMD in 1991. The trend in defections beginning with
the 2001 election underscores how party switching increased with shifting perceptions of parties’
electoral fortunes. As MMD’s electoral dominance came into question, the number of party switches
increased from 2 (out of 147) in the 1996 election to 27 (out of 149) in the 2001 election. Defections
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continued in the following elections as the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National
Development (UPND) emerged as competitive parties. There were 33 defections among the 403
candidateswho ran onMMD, PF, orUPND tickets in the 2006 election. The number of party switches
more than doubled by the 2016 election to 71 out of 432 MMD, PF, or UPND candidates. The jump
in 2016 defections was driven, in part, byMMD’s implosion after it lost the presidency to PF in 2011.
Party affiliation dynamics in Zambia approximate the “electoral black market” described by Sza-
konyi (2020). The country’smain parties allmaintain formal rules for candidate selection. Prospective
candidates are typically interviewed by committees of party members at different levels of party or-
ganization; each level makes a recommendation and passes it on to the next level until final selection
is confirmed by a national committee (Momba, 2005; Wang and Muriaas, 2019). However, nearly all
candidates interviewed for this study indicate that, in practice, the selection process often deviates
from the formal rules. Beyond confirming their ability to personally pay for a campaign, candidates
are often expected to offer “gifts” or bribes to members of selection committees.
Many of the interviewed candidates describe having to participate in informal negotiations with
selection committee members in order to secure a nomination. James Maimba, a PF member who
campaigned for a parliamentary candidate at the local level, explained: “You can pass at the con-
stituency level and fail at the secretariat level. There can be corruption at that level. . . Corruption
does happen.”3 Bradford Machila, an MMD MP, acknowledged that candidates attempt to secure
themselves a party nomination by offering bribes to members of the party’s selection committees.
He noted that members of those committees often expect to be paid: “There’s quite a bit of money
that changes hands. The worst part of it is you’ll have a situation where people who are involved in
the adoption process will tell you that you are by far the best candidate, but they still want some-
thing from you for you to be sure that you will get the position. . . They needed help with school fees,
funerals, this, that.”4
Candidates appear to confront nomination costs regardless of a constituency’s competitiveness.
Some candidates suggest that negotiating a party nomination becomes more expensive in noncom-
3Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 14, 2016.
4Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 13, 2016.
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petitive party strongholds because the likelihood of being elected is virtually assured. Incumbency,
however, does not guarantee selection or lower costs, since party members can opt to nominate
whichever candidate is willing to offer them bribes. In this respect, the candidate who can extract
a guaranteed party ticket from party leaders is able to sidestep the expensive bidding surrounding
nominations in a crowded field. Gary Nkombo, a UPNDMP, points to his guaranteed nomination in
a party stronghold as one of the most important concessions given to him by the party’s president,
Hakainde Hichilema.5
Given the costs associated with candidacy, interviewed candidates indicate that their party affili-
ation choices are influenced by the fact that they expect to pay for their campaigns almost entirely on
their own. Most do not receive direct financial support from parties. Likando Mufalali, a business-
man and UPND MP, was explicit in this regard: “The campaigns here are based on your individual
effort. The party does not give money. If you wait for them to give you money, you might not find
it. I was using my own resources and a few connections.”6 A former MMD parliamentarian, Reuben
Mtolo, tells a similar story: “The party had nothing to offer, so I had to fund the entire campaign.”7
In Zambia, vote- and office-seeking motivations create strong incentives to affiliate with the
largest parties, but especially the ruling party because it can offer reputational and material resources
during a campaign as well as hold out the promise of access to resources after the election. Josephine
Limata, a businesswoman and formerMMDMP explained that she felt obliged to seek office through
the former president’s party because her constituents “are used to being part of the ruling party,”
suggesting that, post-election, she would have access to the state resources needed for clientelistic
distribution.8
Figure 2 provides intuition for how party size can shape party switching. It presents cross-party
defections among candidates who competed in both the 2011 and 2016 elections for one of the three
largest parties (MMD, PF, and UPND). While there were multiple parties listed on the 2016 ballot,
inter-party movements are concentrated among these three parties. Defectors from the large parties
5Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 12, 2016.
6Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 15, 2016.
7Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 14, 2016.
8Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 15, 2016.
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Figure 2: Party Switching across Zambian Parties, 2011-2016.
Notes: The data are drawn from the entire list of party candidates for MMD, PF, and UPND as well
as independent candidates.
systematically chose to move to another large party. Almost none of the other 10 minor parties listed
on the 2016 ballot received defectors. If candidates did not join another large party, they were more
likely to run as independents rather than join a minor party.9 Notably, despite the potential con-
straints posed by ethnic or regional identities associated with specific parties, we find that candidates
move into other parties across these cleavages.10 Moreover, the party-switching patterns suggest that
there are no ideological or programmatic constraints impeding candidates from moving between
parties, a finding consistent with studies showing that Zambian parties do not campaign on the basis
of ideology (Hern, 2020).
Interviewed candidates acknowledge that parties promise cabinet and other appointments to in-
duce party switching. Such appointment promises are more credible whenmade by the larger parties
because they have a greater likelihood of controlling government after an election. In Zambia, ap-
9Supplementary analyses in the appendix show that candidates competing for large parties receive a significant elec-
toral boost.
10A provincial breakdown of party switching is presented in the appendix.
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pointed positions are associatedwith rent-seeking opportunities that allow candidates to recoup their
campaign expenditures and more. Reuben Mtolo explained how a former MMD president routinely
appointed members of the opposition as deputy ministers. Lamenting the fact that floor crossing
continued to be incentivized by the successor PF government, he noted that two MPs from his party
had been appointed as ministers and seven others as deputy ministers.11 Likewise, Josephine Limata
referenced the conditions that make ministerial offers difficult to resist. In her own case, she was
fighting an election petition in court when she was contacted by the former president, Michael Sata.
Limata explains: “When you are in court you need money. Money was coming from who? I am say-
ing thank you for giving me this job as a minister, to support me during trials in court... When the
president says I’ll support you, when you are supported by him, you are safe.”12
4 Candidate survey research design
We conducted a face-to-face survey of candidates who competed in the 2011 Zambian parliamen-
tary elections to gain insight on candidate affiliation dynamics with former and current parties. The
survey included two principal components. The first presented a choice-based conjoint framework
designed to assess candidate preferences over parties. The second included a battery of regular survey
items asking about candidate experiences in joining parties.
The sample for the candidate survey includes 116 winners (sitting MPs) and first losers from the
2011 parliamentary elections. Given 150 single-member parliamentary constituencies, there were
300 potential respondents for our study.13 We included first losers in the sample to ensure that we
were not biasing our results in favor of electorally successful candidates. The decision to focus on the
top two candidates was based on our analysis of Zambian electoral data showing that most parlia-
mentary races are two-person contests. Across constituencies, the first- and second-place candidates
win over 80% of the vote between them. Third-place candidates and beyond typically receive a tiny
11Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 14, 2016.
12Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 15, 2016.
13In the 2011-2016 electoral period, the Zambian parliament had 150 elected members and 8 additional members
appointed by the president.
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fraction of the vote. Such candidates are unlikely to be politically relevant actors.14
We caution that the limited size of our sample obliges us to interpret the survey results conserva-
tively. Some candidates could not be tracked down and others were not accessible. The sample from
which we draw the findings are therefore not necessarily completely representative of the population
of legislative candidates. Yet, for both the conjoint experiment and the candidate survey, the findings
we present are meaningful and substantively large despite the small sample size posing a challenge in
detecting significant effects.
5 Analysis of party affiliation preferences
5.1 Conjoint analysis design
We employ a conjoint experimental framework (Hainmueller et al., 2014) to assess the causal effect of
different party attributes on candidates’ affiliation choices. Following common practice, each survey
respondent was presented with five pairs of party profiles that were generated using a completely
independent randomization process. Each attribute level was assigned with equal probability within
each of the eight party attributes we selected. The attributes and attribute levels are presented in the
appendix. The candidates participating in the survey evaluated a total of 940 party profiles (or 470
party profile pairs).
Survey respondents were presented with two party profiles listing their attributes side-by-side.
Respondents were then asked to identify the party they preferred. To minimize the possibility of
privileging the first attribute encountered (i.e., primacy effects), we randomized the order of attribute
presentation across respondents. Pooling across respondents for the analysis further mitigates con-
cerns over primacy effects.
We follow the method proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2014) to estimate average marginal com-
ponent effects (AMCEs), which can be interpreted as the average difference in the probability of being
the preferred party when comparing different attribute levels, where the average is taken over all pos-
14Details about the sampling technique and sample descriptive statistics are reported in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Effect of Party Attributes on Candidate Preferences over Parties
   belong to the same social organization
   belong to the same church
   are former schoolmates
   are former co−workers
   are family or relatives
Attribute 8 Relationship with the party leader:
   From your ethnic group
   Not from your ethnic group
Attribute 7 Ethnic group of the party leader:
   Financial support for your campaign in the next election
   Adoption as the candidate in your constituency
   A deputy minister position
   A cabinet minister position
   Nothing significant
Attribute 6 Incentives offered for joining:
   Party Members vote in elections to choose 
   National executive committee chooses 
   Constituency−level committee chooses 
   Party leader directly chooses 
Attribute 5 Candidate selection process:
   Party leader directly chooses party leadership
   Party holds regular elections for party leadership
   National executive committee appoints party leadership
Attribute 4 Party leadership selection mechanism:
   Headmen support this party
   Church leaders support this party
   Chiefs support this party
   Voters support this party
Attribute 3 Party support at the constituency:
   51% of voters in the country support this party
   25% of voters in the country support this party
   5% of voters in the country support this party
Attribute 2 Party support at the national level:
   Party holds the presidency
   Party does not hold the presidency
Attribute 1 Party and the presidency:
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Change in Pr(Party preferred by candidate)
Notes: Figure 3 plots the effects of the party attribute values on the probability that the party is pre-
ferred by parliamentary candidates. The dots represent point estimates for the AMCEs; the bars rep-
resent 95% confidence intervals. Rows without estimates represent the reference categories within
each attribute.
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sible combination of the other party attributes. To obtain correct variance estimates, we cluster the
standard errors at the respondent level.
5.2 Conjoint analysis results
The conjoint experiment helps to identify party attributes that influence candidate preferences over
parties. The results summarized in Figure 3 present the point estimates and 95 percent confidence
intervals for the unconditional AMCEs with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The
rows in the plot that are missing the point estimate and confidence interval denote the reference
category for each attribute.
We generally find that candidates appear to prefer parties that will decrease their campaign costs
while increasing their electoral prospects. Consistent with Smyth (2006), we find that candidates
exhibit a strong preference for larger parties with higher levels of national political support, as shown
under Attribute 2 in Figure 3. Compared to a party that enjoys 5% support, parties with 25% support
and 51% support are preferred by 13 percentage points and 18 percentage points, respectively. Our
related null results are substantively important in this context. We find no systematic support for
candidates preferring to join the incumbent president’s party, as shown under Attribute 1. The null
result may reflect the possibility that candidates interpreted the attribute to specifically refer to the PF
of President Edgar Lungu. Candidates might express no such preference if becoming a PF candidate
would confer no immediate electoral advantage within UPND or MMD constituencies.
The organizational characteristics of parties also influence candidates’ party preferences. We find
that candidates prefer a party with institutionalized mechanisms for bottom-up leadership selection
by 13 percentage points in comparison over a party in which the national executive committee ap-
points leadership. This finding aligns with Chhibber et al. (2014), who use Indian data to show that
parties with greater levels of organization are more attractive to politicians. We nuance the finding
in linking this candidate preference to the fact that bottom-up leadership selection also confers can-
didates with greater bargaining power. Since the individuals seeking party leadership must build a
winning coalition among its members, candidates could use their leverage as voting party members
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to extract concessions that offset their campaign costs.
Party inducements, in particular, play a crucial role in influencing candidate preferences. Com-
pared to the baseline in which a party leader offers no inducement, candidates prefer parties that
offer financial support during campaigns (by nearly 12 percentage points) as well as guarantee them
adoption as the party’s candidate (by over 15 percentage points), as shown for Attribute 6 in Figure
3. The candidate preference for guaranteed adoption is likely driven by the interaction between the
burden of campaign financing and electoral geography. In Zambia, parties have developed partisan
strongholds in which much of the competition for office occurs at the adoption or nomination stage
(Choi, 2018). Adoption by the party becomes especially valuable in these party strongholds, since
candidates who receive the guarantee are largely freed from the cost of having to pay members of the
selection committee to secure the nomination.
We further find that candidates strongly prefer parties that offer promises of cabinet appoint-
ments (11 percentage points), as shown for Attribute 6 in Figure 3. This finding is consistent with the
expectation that candidates will seek out opportunities to recoup their campaign costs through rent-
seeking in office. Such appointments also enable candidates to deliver clientelistic benefits to their
constituents. More generally, it should be noted that this set of inducements (campaign finance, guar-
anteed nomination, and cabinet appointments) can be offered by party leaders to recruit defectors as
well as to hold onto candidates recruited by others.
The conjoint experiment fails to uncover any causal effects for a specific method of candidate
adoption. Compared to parties in which the party leader can unilaterally appoint candidates, parties
that use more open forms of candidate selection, such as committee-based systems or primary elec-
tions, are statistically nomore likely to be preferred. We cannotmake definitive claims about why this
is the case, given that candidates do have a preference for guaranteed adoption as the party candidate
(“the party leader promised you”). One possibility is that the preferred selection method varies by
candidate type. While candidates with strong support may prefer primary elections, candidates with
weak support may prefer direct appointment by party leaders because more open methods would
limit their ability to secure the nomination.
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6 Survey of candidate affiliation experiences
While the conjoint experiment provides insight on candidate preferences over party attributes, the
candidate survey allows us to further analyze candidates’ lived experiences with party switching. The
majority of candidates in our sample (57%) have experience with party switching, that is, joining their
current party after leaving another. We next present analysis of the factors influencing their affiliation
and switching choices.
Table 1: Candidate Experiences with Recruitment and Defections
Recruitment Defection Bribery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business owner 1.711∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗ 1.296∗∗ 1.493∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗
(0.666) (0.825) (0.519) (0.604) (0.553) (0.636)
Civic leader 0.410∗ 0.657∗∗ 0.097 0.135 0.697∗∗ 0.517∗
(0.243) (0.277) (0.238) (0.270) (0.286) (0.308)
Prior election experience -0.016 0.789∗∗ -0.824∗∗
(0.294) (0.390) (0.481)
Ruling party member 0.682 1.311∗∗∗ -0.505
(0.486) (0.493) (0.481)
Losing candidate -0.308 -0.900∗ -1.047∗∗
(0.480) (0.490) (0.504)
Woman 1.273∗∗ 0.109 0.061
(0.625) (0.581) (0.598)
Age 0.062∗∗ 0.007 0.000
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
University degree -0.721 0.632 0.388
(0.467) (0.476) (0.484)
Constant -1.987∗∗∗ -5.927∗∗∗ -0.673 -1.916 -1.270∗∗ -0.223
(0.651) (1.971) (0.488) (1.657) (0.534) (1.732)
Observations 108 106 109 108 109 107
Note: Logit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10.
6.1 Dependent variables
There are two dependent variables focused on how candidates have joined parties: recruitment and
defection. Recruitment is a dichotomous variable indicating whether candidates were asked to join
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their current party by its leaders or members. Defection is a dichotomous variable indicating whether
candidates left another party to join their current party. Recruitment and defection are not mutually
exclusive. The recruitment variable represents the demand side among party leaders: Who are they
trying to attract to the party? The defection variable approximates the supply side among candidates:
Who actually moves between parties?
6.2 Independent variables
To capture a candidate’s financial resources, we include a dichotomousmeasure that indicateswhether
a candidate owns a business. Owning a business is themost direct route to the accumulation ofwealth
inmany developing countries, sowe expect businesspeople-turned-candidates to be especially attrac-
tive recruits for parties. This expectation is consistent with prior research showing that businesspeo-
ple enjoy financial advantages when competing for office (Herron and Sjoberg, 2016; Koter, 2017;
Szakonyi, 2020). Additionally, to gauge a candidate’s social linkages, we include a count of a candi-
date’s civic leadership positions in volunteer associations, whether professional, business, labor, or
religious.
Control variables are included to reflect a range of political experiences. We code for prior elec-
tion experience through a count of the number of times a candidate has previously run for office
before 2011. We include a dichotomous indicator of whether the candidate is a member of the cur-
rent ruling PF. A third dichotomous variable reflects whether the candidate lost in the 2011 general
elections. Demographic variables include gender, age, and education (i.e., the candidate holds a uni-
versity degree). Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in the appendix.
6.3 Candidate survey results
Themain findings from the candidate survey are presented in Table 1. The results, shown in log-odds
units, are based on binomial logistic regression. The recruitment results suggest that the most sought-
after candidates have a specific profile: business owners with multiple social linkages. As shown in
Models 1 and 2, the log odds reported for being a business owner are positive and statistically signif-
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icant at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. Based on Model 2, the predicted probability of a business
owner being invited to join a party are approximately 0.5, all else equal; the predicted probability
drops to 0.1 when a candidate does not own a business.
The advantages of being a business owner in candidate recruitment are quite likely shaped by
their financial resources rather than being stand-ins for modernity in a poor country. In supplemen-
tary analyses presented in the appendix, we find no evidence that candidates from other modern or
lucrative professions enjoy similar advantages. Candidates with backgrounds in these professions
(accountants, engineers, executives, lawyers, professors, and teachers) are simply not preferred in the
same way as business owners.
A candidate’s linkages are an important predictor of candidate recruitment. In Model 2, the log
odds for civic leadership positions are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in
two-tailed tests. For example, the predicted probability of being invited to join a party rises from 0.46
for a candidate with one leadership position in a civic organization to 0.62 for a candidate with two
such positions, ceteris paribus.
The recruitment results in Table 1 show no systematic differences for ruling party versus opposi-
tion party members or for winning versus losing candidates. Prior election experience and whether
the candidate lost their election also have no significant effect on recruitment. These null results
are possibly driven by the fact that, given relatively low renomination rates, party leaders do not
infer much information from candidates’ political histories (Choi, 2018). Indeed, these null results
are broadly consistent with the expectation that party leaders will privilege financial over political
qualifications when identifying the candidates likely to succeed in clientelistic campaigning.
Demographic factors do play a role in recruitment. Women candidates are significantly more
likely to be invited to join a party: the predicted probability is 0.66 for women and 0.35 for men. This
result is not simply the product of a formal quota or other gender-based electoral requirements; there
are none in Zambia. Instead, the few women in national politics may be perceived as highly desirable
candidates because – to survive politically as women – they have to be wealthier and better connected
than their male counterparts (Phillips, 2021; Wang and Muriaas, 2019). Another demographic factor
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that influences recruitment is age. Possibly reflecting other correlates of success associated with ex-
perience, older candidates are more likely to report being recruited: the predicted probability rises
from 0.4 for a 53-year old, the mean age in the sample, to 0.53 for a 62-year old, a one-standard
deviation increase in age.
Supplementary analyses reported in the appendix show no systematic impact for ethnicity on
whether a candidate is invited to join a party.15 This ethnicity null result is consistent with the data
illustrated in Figure 2, which highlights the extent towhich cross-party defections occur in all regions
and across all cleavages.
The defection results in Table 1 indicate that business owners are among the most likely candi-
dates to switch parties. Transforming the log-odds for this variable in Model 4 suggests that business
owners are approximately 3.7 times more likely to defect. Candidate linkages are less of a factor, as
those with a larger number of civic leadership positions are no more or less likely to defect.
Candidates with prior election experience are more likely to defect. The log odds in Model 4
indicate that each prior election raises the odds by about 20%. Similarly, defection is relatively more
common among members of the ruling party: a PF member is 3.7 times more likely to have switched
parties when compared to opposition candidates, as indicated by the log odds in Model 4. Losing
candidates are somewhat less likely to have switched parties. No demographic factors systematically
distinguish candidates that are prone to defection.
We also investigatedwhether recruitment by party leaders andmembersmight affect a candidate’s
likelihood of defection. Though not reported in Column (4) of Table 1, we find no significant effect
for recruitment as an independent variable. And its inclusion does not substantively affect the results
in Column (4). While the defection decisions of candidates are not appreciably swayed by outreach
from other parties, this null result is consistent with this study’s broader theoretical framework. It
suggests that, regardless of party outreach, candidates are looking to switch affiliation to maximize
the electoral payoff for their financial investment. And, in the Zambian case, the candidates most
likely to defect—business owners—also happen to have the greatest access to personal resources.
15Almost all ethnicity specifications are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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We further extend the analysis by examining an additional dependent variable to provide insight
on how the recruitment of business owners may influence party nomination processes. Columns
(5) and (6) of Table 1 presents logit analyses of bribery, a dichotomous variable indicating whether
a candidate believes that individuals seeking nomination must provide money or resources to party
members on the candidate adoption committee to guarantee themselves the nomination. To avoid
desirability bias, the survey did not ask candidates if they themselves paid a bribe during the nomi-
nation process; they were instead asked if they thought this is common practice among candidates.
The bribery results indicate that securing party nomination may be a critical campaign cost af-
fecting whether and when candidates consider party switching. Business owners, in particular, may
be distinct political actors who pursue nominations in ways that might give them an advantage over
less wealthy candidates. Based on the log odds reported in Model 6, business owners are 5.2 times
more likely to claim that money must be given to party officials to guarantee themselves a nomina-
tion. Candidates with multiple civic leadership positions are also significantly more likely to believe
that paying for nominations is frequent. The estimated coefficient in Model 6 indicates that each
additional civic leadership position increases the odds of an affirmative response by 68%.
Candidates with prior electoral experience are less likely to claim that paying for nominations
is frequent, suggesting that they may have different non-monetary strategies for seeking a party’s
nomination. The predicted probability for answering the bribery question affirmatively drops from
0.7 for a candidate who has never run for office before to 0.51 for a candidate who has run at least
once before. Losing candidates are also less likely to believe that candidates regularly bribe party
officials to guarantee themselves a nomination. Demographic factors such as gender and age have no
impact in this regard.
7 Conclusion
Drawing on original evidence from parliamentary candidates in Zambia, we advance the research
on party switching by examining what candidates want in a party and what types of candidates are
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most likely be recruited by party leaders. Understanding the individual-level calculations of party
leaders and candidates may enable us to better explain the divergence in party institutionalization
that is increasingly evident among democratizing countries. For example, party leaders may seek to
purposely induce party switching among business owners as a means of enriching themselves rather
than building up their parties. For their part, business owners may accelerate party switching if they
become candidates to pursue other ends, namely, increasing rents for their firms. That would make
them especially sensitive to the relative position of parties in policymaking or the control of specific
portfolios. Future research should aim to disentangle to what extent such choices are made in pursuit
of party interests (electoral competitiveness) versus personal interests (self-enrichment).
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